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Introduction  
 
The Prevent strategy is part of the UK government’s wider Counter-Terrorism 
programme, known as CONTEST, and is concerned with preventing individuals being 
radicalised into violent extremism and terrorism. Underpinning the focus of Prevent are the 
‘Three I’s’; Ideologies, Individuals, and Institutions. The ‘Three I’s’ categorise and 
                                                 
1 This article is based on a masters thesis in Counter-Terrorism at the University of Central Lancashire and was 
supervised by Ian Palmer MSt Cantab. 
2 Corresponding Author Contact: Matt Dryden, Email: Matt.dryden@gmx.com, School of Forensic and Applied 
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Abstract 
Radicalisation is fast becoming one of the most acute and pressing safeguarding 
and child protection issues of the whole century (NSPCC, 2016). However, the 
issue of looked-after children as potential recruits for extremist groups has been 
largely overlooked, despite the universal acknowledgement that looked-after 
children represent the most vulnerable of all demographics within society. This 
research collected rare and vital primary data by interviewing practitioners within 
looked-after children’s, residential, and respite services. The study established that 
practitioners lacked basic awareness of radicalisation and extremism, the Prevent 
strategy, and the Channel programme. It was discovered that practitioners were 
unsure of what constitutes the potential indicators of radicalisation, and how and 
to whom such concerns should be reported. It became apparent that radicalisation 
as a safeguarding and child protection issue has not been afforded a level of focus 
adequate and proportionate to the risk posed, and that other issues, namely child 
sexual exploitation, remain the primary concern in safeguarding contexts. 
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compartmentalise the three main areas of focus of the Prevent strategy, with the collective 
intention to tackle extremist ideology, protect institutions such as schools, prisons, and places 
of religious worship from extremism, and confront those attempting to radicalise vulnerable 
individuals (Home Office, 2011). The Channel programme represents the Prevent strategy’s 
safeguarding and support referral panel, to which individuals deemed vulnerable to 
radicalisation may be referred for support (HM Government, 2011). The Channel 
Vulnerability Assessment Framework comprises of a set of criteria by which a referred 
individual is assessed in order to determine whether or not they are indeed at risk of 
radicalisation and therefore require interventions through the Channel programme. The 
Vulnerability Assessment Framework consists of three categories; Engagement, Intent, and 
Capability, which collectively assess how engaged an individual is with Extremism, how 
intent they are on causing harm, and how capable they actually are of doing so. Engagement 
factors include being at a transitional time of life, a desire for excitement and status, a need 
for identity, meaning, and belonging, and feelings of grievance (Gov.uk, 2012). Of the 7,631 
Prevent referrals made in 2015/16, 14% were deemed suitable for discussion through the 
Channel process. (Home Office, 2017).  
The Prevent duty 2015 has placed a statutory obligation upon educators and other 
relevant agencies working with children, young people, and vulnerable adults, to pay due 
regard to preventing individuals being radicalised (Department for Education, 2015). 
However, the level of training, awareness and knowledge invested in practitioners to equip 
them to fulfil this obligation effectively has been called into question (Quartermaine, 2014). 
Institutions have received much attention as requiring a particular focus to prevent those 
accessing them being radicalised into violent extremism and terrorism. Schools and prisons 
are the two institutions which have shared this focus, yet residential children’s homes and 
other care settings have seemingly been largely neglected (Mattsson et al, 2016). This is 
despite the wide acknowledgement that looked-after children and young people, and those 
accessing care services are amongst the most vulnerable of all in society (Skillicorn et al, 
2015, pp. 2015).  
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This research aims to investigate and establish the current level of awareness, training, 
and understanding of radicalisation possessed by practitioners operating within residential, 
looked-after children, and respite services. Furthermore, this research endeavours to build a 
case for the improved provision of awareness and training for practitioners operating within 
children’s residential homes and other care settings. The acknowledgement that such settings 
and those accessing them are acutely vulnerable as targets for those wishing to radicalise 
vulnerable young people into extremism and terrorism is of paramount importance. 
 
Literature Review 
 
Radicalisation is fast becoming one of the most acute and pressing safeguarding and 
child protection issues of the whole century (NSPCC, 2016). The term radicalisation has 
become central to both terrorism studies and counter-terrorism policy (Kundnani, 2012, pp. 3-
25), and is defined as a personal process whereby individuals adopt extreme social, political, 
and/or religious ideals and aspirations, where the attainment of goals justifies the use of 
violence (Wilner and Dubouloz, 2010, pp. 33-51). However, Hafez and Mullins, 2015 
criticise the use of the existing ‘process’ metaphor in the attempt to rationalise and better 
understand radicalisation, instead promoting the use of their ‘puzzle’ terminology. Whilst the 
term ‘puzzle’ does dispel the ill-informed implied notions of order and logic being universally 
present in the radicalisation ‘process’ by the former explanation, and indeed better reflects the 
unpredictable nature of the issue, it does little to actually further our understanding of the 
subject itself. (Hafez and Mullins, 2015, pp. 2-9).  
 
The competing theories of radicalisation; A lack of consensus  
The literature relating to radicalisation and the causes and theories thereof is extensive 
and wide ranging, yet still no consensus exists about its meaning and pathways (Sedgwick, 
2010, pp. 479-494). Paying more than passing attention to a selection of the main umbrella 
theories in this research would be impossible, and crucially would detract from its greater 
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intended focus. Therefore, three areas of radicalisation theory will be explored; Vulnerability 
and the ‘Existential motivators for extremism’, Political Grievance, and Religion and 
Theology. 
 
Vulnerability and the existential motivators of extremism and terrorism 
For the purposes of this research the primary focus will be upon the underlying 
facilitating vulnerability factors of radicalisation. The question will be framed in the context 
of why individuals are radicalised, rather than how. This approach and its reasoning is 
underpinned by Kundnani (2012, p.129), who likens the quest of scholars and academics to 
apply definitive causality for radicalisation into violent extremism and terrorism to issues 
such as religion and theology to viewing radicalisation as a virus which spreads from an 
already infected person to their associates; whereby “all we have done is explain the process 
of infection, not why the virus exists in the first place”. If we accept the virus to be 
radicalisation, we can apply Maslow’s (1943) Hierarchy of Need to understand that what 
makes individuals susceptible to radicalisation is vulnerability itself. The theory depicts a five 
tier system of human need, consisting of physiological needs, safety needs, love and 
belonging needs, and self-actualisation. The theory states that human behaviour drives 
individuals to fulfil these needs, initially through legitimate or positive means, but in the 
absence of such opportunity, illegitimate or negative means will then likely be used in the 
pursuit of their fulfilment (Maslow, 1943, pp. 370-396). This theory is supported by Cottee 
and Hayward (2011, pp. 963-986), who discuss factors such as the desire for excitement, 
meaning or belonging, and glory or achievement as “existential motivators" for engaging in 
terrorism. It is stated that terrorist membership and activity may provide an outlet for basic 
existential desires that cannot find expression through legitimate needs. Similarly, the 
radicalisation process is described by Sageman, 2008 as being “not about how they think, but 
how they feel”, focussing upon kinship and brotherhood as playing a central role in the appeal 
of extremist and terrorist groups to vulnerable individuals. This has become known as ‘bunch 
of guys theory’, and is based upon socio-cultural thought, which states that extremist views 
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can often be borne from a group mentality based around kinship and brotherhood, much like 
that often associated with the culture of violence within gangs (Sageman, 2008, p.13).  
 
Political Grievance 
Radicalisation through political grievance often occurs in response to political, 
economic or social trends (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008, pp. 415-430).  The English 
Defence League (EDL) uses the social concerns of segments of the general population to 
garner support for its cause. As large numbers of the white working class become increasingly 
despondent at the lack of employment opportunities and fearful of increasing numbers of 
immigrants entering the UK labour market, minority groups, namely Muslims have become 
the scapegoat. The EDL rhetoric places the blame for a lack of employment opportunities, the 
disintegration of British culture, and Terrorism squarely at the feet of Muslims, appealing to 
many disenfranchised white working class as a target for their frustrations. (Winlow, Hall, 
and Treadwell, 2017, pp. 142-146).   
 
Theology and religion 
Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman (2009, pp. 20-22) highlights the role of religion and 
theology in the radicalisation process, and refer to individuals being “theologically 
predisposed” to radicalisation into violent extremism and terrorism. Issues arise with attempts 
to apply causality for radicalisation into violent extremism to religion and theology when 
evidence is presented which highlights the fact that the majority of individuals who possess 
radical beliefs do not proceed to engage in violent action. Likewise, a substantial percentage 
of those who do engage in violent extremism are actually found not to be significantly pious, 
and often do not possess any substantial understanding of the radical religious rhetoric they 
claim to represent (Borum, 2009, p.30).  
However, the very study of the concept of radicalisation as a means to identify and 
eliminate the motivating factors of terrorists has been criticised as being superficial, and as 
representing the ‘policing of thought’. The study of radicalisation as a means of understanding 
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and predicting the drivers of terrorism is based almost entirely on the assumption that 
extremist thought is a precursor to extremist action, which has now largely been discredited 
(Borum, 2011, p.1).  
 
The Prevent duty; Are practitioners sufficiently trained, or set up to fail? 
From 01 July 2015 all schools, child care providers, and other select agencies are 
required by law to exercise due regard to the prevention of individuals being drawn into 
Radicalisation, in accordance with section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 
(Department for Education, 2015). However, research found that the skills and knowledge of 
teachers and other practitioners to respond to such issues and host debate are lacking, as is 
their confidence and knowledge in assessing whether information coming from such 
classroom debates and interaction with students need or need not be reported to the authorities 
(Quartermaine, 2014, pp. 13-29). This has resulted in some high-profile errors of judgement 
which have been highlighted in international media, such as the incident where staff at a 
nursery in Luton threatened to report a four year old boy to prevent practitioners after drawing 
his father cutting a cucumber. The boy mispronounced his explanation of the drawing which 
was adjudged by staff to sound like ‘cooker bomb’ (The Guardian, 2016). Kundnani (2008, 
pp. 178-179) states that the visiting of nursery schools by Prevent workers to brief staff on 
how to identify possible signs of radicalisation is tantamount to using young children as 
informants against their parents, taking advantage of their inability to know what to keep 
private. 
It is stated that the Prevent strategy fails to clearly define key terms such as 
radicalisation, extremism and vulnerability, a vagueness which is likely to undermine the 
confidence and likelihood of both students and staff to talk openly in schools and other 
education settings (O’Donnell, 2015, pp. 53-76). This sentiment is supported by Jamieson and 
Flint (2015, pp. 59-62) who discuss the imbalance between the demands placed upon 
practitioners to accurately teach such content, and the lack of available resources, and state 
“There is a great deal of confusion in the public at large as to the meaning of the terms 
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terrorism, extremism and radicalisation, yet there are few resources available that enable the 
teaching profession to explain these complex and controversial issues in the school 
classroom”. The Home Office (2016) describe their Prevent training courses as being 
“Introductory training, offering individuals a foundation on which to develop further 
knowledge around the risks of radicalisation”, which has been criticised as insufficient and 
not fit for purpose. It is argued that there exists little evidence to suggest that Prevent actually 
delivers any educational processes which explicitly build youth resilience to extremism 
(Thomas, 2016, pp. 171-187). A research project carried out by Calderdale Young Advisors to 
gain the voice of the child as to their understanding around radicalisation, extremism and 
terrorism generated data which further suggests a lack of clarity and understanding of such 
fundamental terminology. The data indicated that “most young people thought extremism was 
terrorism, and that overall the responses show us that most young people do not know what 
extremism is” (Calderdale Safeguarding Children Board, 2017).  
 
The Channel Programme: Efficacy and Transparency  
The efficacy of the Channel programme has long been criticised, especially with 
regards to the number of referrals vs the number of cases approved for interventions. As the 
number of individuals referred continues to increase, so do the number of individuals referred 
‘unnecessarily’, and who are not deemed suitable for Intervention through the Channel 
process (Radicalisationresearch.org, 2016). As touched on previously in the introduction, of 
the 7,631 Prevent referrals made in 2015/16, only14% were deemed suitable for discussion 
through the Channel process. Furthermore, 381 individuals subsequently received support 
through the Channel process, with just 4% still receiving support at the time this information 
was published. 83% of those who ceased receiving support did so with their vulnerability to 
radicalisation judged to ‘have been reduced’(Home Office, 2017). Claiming such success has 
resulted in repeated calls for the U.K government to show its methods for measuring 
outcomes, and publish detailed figures, yet this challenge remains unanswered (Weeks, 2017, 
pp.1-18). 
  
 
 
 
 
Matt Dryden: Radicalisation: the last taboo in safeguarding and child protection? 
 
 
 
 
108 
The creation of ‘suspect communities’? 
The National Union of Students and the National Union of Teachers have historically 
lead the opposition to Prevent, with the former strongly criticising the Prevent duty as an 
imposition upon education providers, forcing them to participate in the Government’s 
“programme of racial and religious profiling”, and calling for it to be banned by Government 
and boycotted by education providers (NUS Connect, 2015). Meanwhile, the latter also 
remains critical of the Prevent duty but takes a more pragmatic approach, calling for the 
Prevent strategy to be reviewed and agencies such as themselves used to identify alternative 
ways to safeguard children and young people from Radicalisation (National Union of 
Teachers, 2016). The Prevent duty is similarly criticised by the NHS for the legal obligation 
of its Accident and Emergency staff to report any concerns relating to radicalisation of 
individuals they encounter (Heath-Kelly, 2016, pp. 29-45). General Practitioners have 
expressed similar concerns, claiming that the Prevent duty stigmatises already marginalised 
individuals and compromises patient confidentiality (Wright and Hankins, 2017, pp. 288-
289). It is alleged that ‘the war on terror’ and subsequent anti-terror legislation packaged 
under the Prevent strategy has established British Muslims as a ‘suspect community’, 
targeting them for surveillance, and undermining national security rather than improving it by 
alienating and stigmatising Muslim communities (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009, pp. 646-
666). Furthermore, it is explicitly suggested that current Counter-terror measures actually feed 
and sustain terrorism (Choudhury and Fenwick, 2011, pp. 151-181). However, Greer (2010, 
pp. 1171-1190) states that the link between UK anti-terror legislation and Muslims becoming 
a ‘suspect community’ is unreliable and one-dimensional, suggesting the relationship between 
the two is not as simple as oppressive anti-terror laws creating a suspect community as is 
often presented in the media (Greer, 2010, pp. 111-1190). David Anderson QC, the 
independent reviewer of counter-terrorism legislation refutes the claims of the poisonous 
nature of the Prevent strategy and its underpinning counter-terrorism legislation by insisting 
that it is in fact proportionate. Anderson elaborates that the “hostile narrative of power-hungry 
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secret services, police insensitivity, and laws being ratcheted up to new levels of oppression 
is, quite simply, false” (Anderson, 2016, pp. 90-91).  
 
Radicalisation as a safeguarding and child protection issue 
It is stated that approaching radicalisation as a child protection issue is not helpful, and 
risks the roles of social workers and police becoming indistinguishable (Stanley and Guru, 
2015, pp. 353-366). The concern over the role of the social worker in matters of radicalisation 
is supported by McKendrick and Finch (2017, pp. 308-324), who go as far as to say that the 
securitisation approach to modern social problems is damaging to communities. However, the 
Department for Education (2015) state that protecting children, young people and vulnerable 
adults from radicalisation should be perceived as part of all agencies’ wider, existing 
safeguarding duty, and that keeping children, young people and vulnerable adults safe from 
the threat of radicalisation is a safeguarding issue that needs to be viewed and addressed in the 
same way as other threats such as child sexual exploitation, neglect and abuse (West 
Yorkshire Safeguarding Children Board, 2016). The radicalisation of children and young 
people currently remains above all viewed as a security risk, focussed upon the detection and 
incapacitation of individuals, rather than acknowledging those radicalised as victims in need 
of support (Van San, Sieckelinck, and De Winter, 2013, pp. 267-289).  
A serious case review was published in July 2017 in response to the deaths of two 
young brothers from Brighton, who were killed fighting in Syria in support of an Al-Qaeda 
affiliated group believed to be the Al-Nusra front in 2014. The review explored how despite 
substantial involvement from social care services and multi-agency partners, there existed no 
indicators that the siblings were likely to travel to Syria. The review states that this case 
represents the real challenge for professionals in being able to identify children that are being 
radicalised. (Brighton and Hove local safeguarding children board, 2017).  
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Radicalisation, institutions, and looked-after children 
One of the three strategic objectives of the Prevent strategy is to work with institutions 
where there are risks of radicalisation that need to be addressed (HM Government, 2015). 
Prisons and schools have received the most attention of all institutions in terms of training and 
investment (Mattsson et al, 2016, pp. 251-265). It should come as no surprise that prisons can 
act as breeding grounds for terrorism, providing access for committed extremists to a captive 
audience of vulnerable and disaffected individuals seeking purpose and belonging (Mulcahy 
et al, 2013, pp. 4-14). Likewise, the same behavioural, and social vulnerabilities are present 
amongst children and young people in or accessing care, yet research, government focus, and 
the allocation of resources fails to keep pace in this specific area (Crerar, 2015, p.12).  
The Trojan Horse Affair refers to an anonymous letter which was exposed to suggest a 
series of schools in Birmingham were involved in a coordinated plot to radicalise Muslim 
students. Although the subsequent investigation failed to identify a concerted and deliberate 
plot to radicalise Muslim students, it did criticise many senior managers, governors and local 
authority representatives for failing to respond proactively to concerns raised about the issue 
of the radicalisation of students. What this identifies is a clear enhanced vulnerability and 
susceptibility of children and young people to be radicalised in institutional settings, or at the 
very least for institutional settings to act as facilitators for extremist thought and incubators 
for terrorism (Mogra, 2016, pp. 444-465).  
The Looked After Children and young people who reside within children's homes 
either on a full-time residential basis, who attend on a short-term ongoing basis in a respite 
capacity, or who access the service on a short-term basis in a crisis situation are often by 
definition acutely vulnerable (Appleton and Stanley, 2010, pp. 383-386). Those attending 
children's homes in any of the above capacities do so either as a result of abuse, neglect or a 
parental inability to safeguard and protect them from harm, which leave deeply entrenched 
trauma and a wide range of social, psychological and behavioural vulnerabilities (Kendrick, 
Steckley and Lerpiniere, 2008, pp. 79-93).  
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The numbers of children being placed in foster care are increasing as a result of 
physical, sexual, and emotional or psychological abuse and neglect, and are believed to be 
more likely to experience negative outcomes including those of a behavioural, 
neurobiological and social nature (Leve et al, 2012, pp. 1197- 1211). Based on 2016 data 
supplied by government, the number of children looked after continues to rise steadily and is 
5% higher than in 2012. Furthermore, 40% of all care leavers aged 19-21 were not in 
education, employment or training, compared to just 14% of non-care leavers of the same age 
category (Gov.uk, 2016). Research shows that children who enter the care system achieve far 
less positive outcomes than those who continue to live with parents or carers. It also 
highlights a heightened risk of becoming involved in substance misuse, anti-social behaviour, 
crime, and is linked to a higher propensity to carry such behaviours into adulthood, 
culminating in an increased likelihood of serving a prison sentence (Pinto and Woolgar, 2015, 
p. 181). The over representation of looked after children in the youth justice system is 
symptomatic of the profound and enduring negative outcomes which stem from loss, neglect 
and trauma suffered by those who subsequently enter care (Prison Reform Trust, 2016), yet 
residential care placements remain unlikely to provide young people with a secure sense of 
attachment (Every Child Matters, 2003). It stands to reason that carers and residential 
children's home staff employed as corporate parents should receive significant investment in 
terms of training to allow them to respond decisively to all manner of safeguarding issues 
including radicalisation, yet sadly at present neither parents or carers are receiving the 
necessary support and investment in this regard (Pels and Ruyter, 2012, pp. 311-325). 
 
Predictions and hypotheses 
• It is believed that the research will uncover a lack of radicalisation-related awareness 
possessed by participants. It is anticipated that this will be evidenced in a lack of 
definitional clarity of what constitutes radicalisation, knowledge of how to spot the 
potential signs of radicalisation, and a lack of understanding of how to report 
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radicalisation related concerns. Furthermore, it is anticipated that participants will lack 
awareness of the Government’s Prevent strategy and Channel programme.  
• It is predicted that the research will identify a lack of radicalisation related training 
possessed by participants, including a lack of knowledge relating to the availability of 
such training.  
It is expected that the research will indicate a general lack of government and local authority 
focus upon radicalisation as a safeguarding and child protection issue, which will be 
evidenced by the disparity in participants’ level of confidence and detail of response to 
questions framed in a radicalisation or child sexual exploitation context respectively. In 
theory, participants are expected to respond more confidently to child sexual exploitation 
related questions, and less confidently to those related to radicalisation. 
 
Methods 
 
The overall aim of the study is to ascertain the level of practitioner awareness, 
training, and knowledge of radicalisation, the Prevent strategy, and Channel programme 
within the looked-after children and care services sector of a local authority in the North of 
England. The study also aims to establish whether radicalisation is currently being afforded 
the proportionate level of focus and investment given the substantial threat from international 
terrorism worldwide.  
Objectives of the study;  
• To successfully interview a five-participant sample consisting of practitioners who 
work in children’s residential and care services. 
• To thematically analyse the data to identify its results. 
• To produce a final report highlighting the key findings and establish whether these 
support or contradict the existing literature and original hypotheses of this research 
project as a whole.  
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Design 
The research aimed to establish practitioner opinion and level of knowledge in relation 
to the six key themes of awareness, training, signs, risks, responsibility, and reporting. 
Furthermore, the research aimed to identify the extent of participant familiarity with the 
Prevent strategy and Channel programme. Semi-structured interviews were used to enable 
sufficient coverage of each key content area, whist permitting relevant participant elaboration. 
Thematic analysis was utilised to analyse the captured data with thematic coding, which 
identified themes from the research and allowed the appropriate categorisation.  
 
Sample 
The sample consisted of five participants, all of whom worked within the looked after 
children, residential and respite services. The sample was chosen to reflect as accurately as 
possible the varied demographic makeup of the workforce, including in terms of gender, age, 
and years of service. The age of participants ranged between 35-45 (M=40.4), (STD=3.23), 
with years of service between 1-20 (M=11.2), (STD=3.33). 
 
Table 1. Breakdown of participant demographics. 
Participant Age Gender Years of service 
01 35 F 2 
02 42 M 20 
03 45 M 18 
04 39 F 15 
05 41 F 1 
 
Procedure 
Prospective participants were contacted by email with the informed consent sheet, 
participant information sheet and a copy of the questions they would be asked. This was to 
allow prospective participants to make an informed decision as to whether they wished to 
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participate in the study. The interviews were voice recorded to allow accurate and exact 
transcription, and to facilitate thematic analysis. The semi-structured interview typology used 
allowed participants to elaborate on any areas they deemed necessary, adding further 
contextual information, whilst ensuring all areas of focus were covered without excessive 
deviation.  
 
Ethics 
Initial approval was given by the head of residential and looked-after children’s 
services in the local authority participating in the study. Additional authority was granted by 
the University of Central Lancashire’s ethics committee, which granted full approval to begin 
the research. Participant anonymity was achieved by the process of assigning participants with 
unique identification numbers, which were used throughout the process of thematic analysis 
and during the results. 
 
Analysis 
 
The data was analysed using thematic analysis, and adopted a six-stage approach, 
encompassing all conducted stages from collating the data, to producing the completed report. 
The six stages include; Building familiarity with the data, generating codes, identification of 
themes, reviewing themes, defining themes, and production of the report.  
Stage 1: Building familiarity with the data; This stage focussed upon the reading and 
re-reading of the data set to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the data existed. 
Spending time away from the data was used as a technique to apply fresh perspective to the 
data. 
Stage 2: Generating codes; The coding of this particular data set was conducted 
manually, highlighting potential codes and themes. Codes and themes were then collated 
together from the entire data set.  
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Stage 3: Identification of themes; This stage was centred on identifying themes from 
the initial coding conducted in the previous section. The initial codes were used to develop 
more in-depth themes based upon the existence of relevant codes.  
Stage 4: Reviewing themes; The themes which were highlighted from the initial codes 
in the previous section were refined here. The themes were reviewed to establish whether 
their existence was justified in their own right, or whether they should be reconstituted within 
another existing theme.  
Stage 5: Defining themes; After reviewing the highlighted themes, appropriate names 
were given to each theme to identify the exact nature of each theme. In this case the themes 
given were all one-word only, allowing effective understanding of the information contained 
within.  
Stage 6: Production of the report; Producing the report was the final stage to be 
completed. This stage encompassed presenting the information gathered and developed in all 
of the previous stages in a concise, structured and interesting way, allowing the reader to 
easily understand the information presented for each individual theme.  
   
Discussion 
 
The key findings of the literature and research are outlined below within their 
respective sub-categories, with the data interpreted and synthesised to create an in-depth 
summary of the main findings. 
 
Awareness 
Awareness of radicalisation, Prevent, and Channel is highlighted in the literature as 
lacking (Jamieson and Flint, 2015, pp. 5-62). There also exists a distinct lack of consensus 
around the meanings of such key terms, which is likely to lead to uncertainty and a lack of 
confidence of both practitioners and young people in discussing the issue (Sedgwick, 2010, 
pp. 479-494). 
  
 
 
 
 
Matt Dryden: Radicalisation: the last taboo in safeguarding and child protection? 
 
 
 
 
116 
The research supported the literature and the original hypothesis in identifying that 
there was a general misunderstanding of what constituted radicalisation, and a confusion 
around key terms. Participants did, however, identify that radicalisation was a form of 
brainwashing or influencing of another person, and acknowledged it as a form of exploitation. 
However, when asked; “Are you aware of what Radicalisation is, and how it is relevant to 
your role and the agency you represent?”, one participant stated;  
 
“For me, radicalisation is about people getting involved with other cultures that want 
to do stuff to others and harm them, like suicidal bombings and making bombs and 
stuff like that”. 
 
The response illustrates a misunderstanding of radicalisation, and appears to suggest a 
perceived interchangeability of terminology with regards to radicalisation, extremism and 
terrorism. Moreover, the mention of suicide bombing may illustrate a tendency to associate 
radicalisation purely with Islamist typologies of extremism, which is symptomatic of the 
marginalisation of the right-wing issue within the public consciousness and the 
oversubscription to the thought of radicalisation being a purely Muslim problem. All but one 
participant stated that they were familiar with the Prevent strategy, however they were not 
able to describe it in any detail and tended to have it confused with the Channel programme. 
The lack of awareness of Prevent and Channel outlined in the research also supported the 
literature and the original hypothesis, with only one participant stating that they were familiar 
with the Channel programme. The remaining participants having never heard of it before. 
When asked “Are you familiar with the government's Channel programme, including its 
referral process in your area?”, one participant responded;  
 
“No, I've not heard of the Channel programme, the only thing I've heard of is the 
Prevent strategy, so the channel programme is a new one. I might have heard about 
it, but I don’t remember it” P.02. 
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This is representative of the lack of focus placed upon radicalisation in comparison to other 
safeguarding issues such as Child Sexual Exploitation, and demonstrates a fundamental lack 
of knowledge and awareness of the core elements of radicalisation specific safeguarding 
provisions. 
 
Training 
A lack of radicalisation related training and promotion of training was highlighted in 
the literature. The ambiguity surrounding key terms such as radicalisation, extremism and 
terrorism highlighted by information captured from interviews with school children by a local 
authority suggests that they have either not received this information in school, or that the 
level of knowledge possessed by teachers delivering the sessions was not sufficient 
(Calderdale Safeguarding Children Board, 2017). HM Government themselves describe their 
Prevent training as “Introductory training, offering individuals a foundation on which to 
develop further knowledge around the risks of radicalisation” (HM Government, 2016). 
However, describing and acknowledging their Prevent training for practitioners as 
introductory, and stating that it is designed to represent a foundation on which practitioners 
can themselves expand upon risks appearing to practitioners as a ‘tickbox’ exercise, and could 
result in opposition, or at best, lethargy and disinterest. It appears that practitioners’ legal duty 
to prevent individuals being drawn into radicalisation may not at present be matched by the 
quality of training they are being armed with in order to fulfil this duty effectively. 
The serious case review published in July 2017 in response to the deaths of two 
brothers from Brighton whilst fighting for the Al-Qaeda affiliated Al-Nusra front in 2014 is 
said to highlight the extent of the challenge faced by professionals in being able to effectively 
identify children at risk of being radicalised. It was stated that despite a multitude of 
professionals being involved with the family, that there were no signs to suggest the siblings 
were preparing to travel abroad. (Brighton and Hove local safeguarding children board, 2017). 
Whether the practitioners involved had received any radicalisation related training, and if so, 
whether the quality of the training was sufficient are questions which must surely be asked in 
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this situation. It seems improbable that substantial multi-agency involvement such as that said 
to have been present in this case would not have managed to identify signs indicating the 
intentions or the level of radicalisation of the siblings. As a safeguarding practitioner 
experienced in both leading and operating within a multi-agency team it appears 
unfathomable that no signs existed in this case. It appears more likely that the level of training 
and awareness undertaken and possessed by the practitioners was not sufficient enough to 
empower them to identify the signs. 
The research strongly supported the literature and the original hypothesis, indicating 
that there is a lack of training and promotion of training related to radicalisation for 
practitioners. Only 40% of respondents had received the WRAP training, however in both 
cases the training was received whilst employed in a different role, not within a residential or 
respite service. 100% of respondents identified that there was not enough training available 
relating to radicalisation. Participants were asked “Do you believe there is sufficient training 
available on Radicalisation as part of your role?” One respondent stated;  
 
“Is it sufficient?, it’s probably not enough I’d say. I’ve not been on it, but I haven’t 
needed to” P.02. 
 
This response illustrates a lack of understanding of the need for practitioners of all levels and 
seniority to undergo training and become competent in responding to concerns relating to 
radicalisation in safeguarding contexts.  
 
Another participant stated; 
 
  “I don’t think I've come across any training since being in this service to do with 
radicalisation. However, I don’t know if something has been put on the new 
training matrix at present with what's going on, I couldn't answer that, but I don’t 
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think at this moment in time that there is sufficient training, and I think people need 
to be made aware and be able to make a judgment” P03. 
 
As a practitioner having worked in various safeguarding related roles, and currently operating 
within children's residential and respite settings, it is apparent that there is a lack of urgency 
and importance attached to undertaking radicalisation related training, both by individual 
practitioners and management teams. The WRAP training is currently not mandatory, and an 
individual successfully undertaking the training relies upon an existing interest in the subject 
and them taking the time to search for relevant training, as the level of promotion of such 
training remains insufficient. Furthermore, the individual successfully gaining approval to 
undertake the training will rely upon their manager assessing the training as appropriate and 
necessary to their role. The Prevent and Channel general awareness e-learning training 
courses are free to all, however like the WRAP training, these packages are not mandatory 
and are not actively promoted by local authorities enough, therefore awareness of their 
availability remains low. 
 
Responsibility 
Confusion around responsibility is evident in the literature, evidenced by the National 
Union of Students (2015), and The National Union of Teachers (2016) both opposing the 
legal duty applied to them in paying due regard to protecting individuals from radicalisation. 
The literature highlights that parents are an undervalued and underutilised resource in 
working towards the prevention of radicalisation, despite being uniquely placed to notice any 
signs indicative of radicalisation (Pels and Ruyter, 2012, pp. 311-325). Disparity is evident 
between the messages espoused by Educate Against Hate (2017) who advise parents that they 
are the first line of defence against the radicalisation of their children, and urged them to be 
vigilant of the signs and know what action to take, and Davies (2008 pp. 50-51) who 
identifies the lack of a universal profile or journey of radicalisation as a factor which renders 
efforts of parents or teachers to play ‘spot the terrorist’ as useless. Such contradiction in the 
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existing literature is not helpful and risks causing confusion amongst practitioners, agencies, 
and parents. The literature also highlights how protecting children from radicalisation is a part 
of every agency’s existing safeguarding policy, and that the theory and reporting mechanisms 
for doing so are very much in line with existing policy on responding to other safeguarding 
concerns such as Child Sexual Exploitation (Department for Education, 2015).  
The apparent lack of empowerment and training of parents to be better equipped to 
respond to radicalisation related concerns highlighted in the literature was supported by the 
research and further supported the original hypothesis; Participants were asked “In whose 
remit of responsibility should preventing Radicalisation fall? For example, Police, Education 
providers, parents, youth workers, social workers etc”. One participant responded; 
 
 “I think everybody should be educated on it and know. Everybody who works with 
children, young people and families should have that education, and I suppose 
making parents aware, because I don’t know if they know. We know through work, 
but I don’t know if parents know about that. Because prevent go into schools don’t 
they, and they do awareness sessions. However, as a parent, I've not had any 
information from a school telling me what it is, I just know because of my role” 
P05.  
 
This response indicated support for the need for parents to be better educated in relation to 
radicalisation and for them to be viewed as an important resource in the prevention of 
radicalisation. Also suggested was an over-reliance upon ‘professionals’ and ‘practitioners’ as 
being best placed in this regard, overlooking the influence of friends, parents, and other 
family members. 
The research also mirrored sentiments expressed in the literature relating to it being 
everybody’s responsibility to be vigilant and respond to concerns relating to radicalisation, 
and specifically that agencies must take a multi-agency approach in this response and be 
confident in sharing information. Whilst a shared responsibility of parents, carers, school 
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staff, police, youth workers, and so on to prevent the radicalisation of individuals is a noble 
pursuit, it does risk creating a culture lacking in personal accountability.  
 
Risk 
The literature identified looked-after children and those accessing care services as 
being amongst the most vulnerable of all in society, having often suffered severe early life 
trauma, abuse and neglect (Kendrick, Steckley, and Lerpiniere, 2008, pp. 7-93). Despite the 
substantial acknowledgement of the increased vulnerability of this category of children and 
young people, no existing literature was found specifically linking them to an increased risk 
or propensity to being radicalised into violent extremism and terrorism.  
The research arrived at two distinct conclusions with regards to the identification by 
participants of those believed to be most at risk of radicalisation, which is very much 
representative of the polarisation present in the literature. Firstly, 60% of participants 
highlighted vulnerability generally as the most significant risk factor and enabler of 
radicalisation, whilst 40% of all participants explicitly mentioned Islam and Muslims, 
specifically the way they believe the media to portray them as being most vulnerable to 
radicalisation and most in need of protection and safeguarding.  
When asked “Who do you feel is most at risk from Radicalisation? A particular age, 
gender, religion, ethnic group?”, one participant responded;  
 
“If we look in the media we’d assume Islam and the kind of Isis influenced are 
amongst the most prevalent in radicalisation for young people, so you'd have to say 
religion to a point” P02 
 
Another participant answered;  
 
“I think that media portrays that it’s Muslim males that are most at risk but I'm very 
aware that that's not always the case” P04. 
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Both responses highlight a perception of a reflex association between radicalisation and 
Muslims specifically. Both participants explicitly cite the media as being responsible for this 
perception, and appear eager to make it clear that it is not their own opinion. This is 
symptomatic of the sensitivity applied to the issue of radicalisation and Muslims by 
practitioners, a level of sensitivity which could result in avoidance of action for such concerns 
for fear of being labelled as discriminatory. 
From working with acutely vulnerable children and young people in various 
safeguarding settings it is apparent that there exists a significant degree of chance as to the 
typology of exploitation an individual is subject to, which may be dependent largely upon 
geographical location and demographic makeup of location. For too long government focus 
has been upon protecting Muslims from being radicalised by other Muslims who use Islam as 
the common ground and facilitator in the radicalisation process. The quest of a potential 
victim to fulfil unmet basic human needs does not discriminate between exploitation 
typology, whether sexual, gang related, or extremism of Islamist or right-wing derivations. An 
individual need not subscribe to Islam in order to subscribe to Islamic extremism. If the cause 
offers love and belonging, kinship, safety and security, and identity, it is likely to appeal to 
the potential victim, and those grounds alone are likely to prove sufficiently enticing. We 
must not be so short-sighted as to assume that extremist and terrorist typologies, whether 
Islamist or right-wing cannot and do not span cultural, religious and ethnic boundaries. 
 
Signs 
The literature highlighted the level of ambiguity and confusion surrounding the 
potential signs indicative of the onset of the radicalisation process evident in an individual. 
The desire for identity and belonging, a desire for excitement and adventure, feelings of 
grievance, and being at a transitional time of life are all listed in the Channel vulnerability 
assessment framework as factors which could suggest an individual has entered the 
radicalisation process (Gov.UK, 20120.  
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The research reflects the ambiguity of the supposed signs of radicalisation present in 
the literature, with participants largely unable to distinguish between potential signs of 
radicalisation and those indicative of CSE. However, the tone and fluency of responses 
between Exploitation typologies differed greatly. The participants were tentative in their 
responses when asked to identify potential signs of radicalisation, yet were much more 
confident and fluent when answering in relation to CSE. When asked: “Could you identify 
signs, such as physical, behavioural, ideological, which could indicate a child/young person is 
being/has been radicalised?”, one participant stated; 
 
“I don’t think I've come across any. I should really know this. I haven't come across it, 
but because I've had Prevent training in a team meeting in my previous job I should 
really be aware. I know there’s different symbols to be aware of the families might 
have up in the home. I suppose it’s like being groomed in a way isn't it, like maybe 
hanging around with different people that they don’t usually hang around with, 
behaviours might change. They might become withdrawn or even more outgoing. I 
think they become quite secretive, or they can do. That kind of thing I think I might be 
aware of. And probably a lot of them together. Who they're hanging around with” 
P05.  
 
The same participant then went on to list fluently a number of potential signs of CSE, after 
which they acknowledged that the signs of radicalisation and those of Child Sexual 
Exploitation are in fact incredibly similar; 
 
“Missing episodes, being secretive, their physical appearance might change, they 
might have new mobile phones, clothes, possessions, hanging around with different 
people, substance misuse. Their behaviour might change. They might not go to school. 
I suppose it’s quite similar to the last question really” P05. 
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This similarity is supported further when considering the engagement factors outlined in the 
Channel Vulnerability Assessment Framework, in fact the engagement factors listed could be 
equally indicative of CSE. The ambiguity of such factors when listed as potential indicators of 
radicalisation are not viewed as helpful, as practitioners become indecisive as to whether their 
concerns are justified, or whether they are felt as a product of their anxiety and 
hypersensitivity to fulfil their legal duty to protect individuals from radicalisation.  
It has become clear that those practitioners who are confident and familiar with 
identifying the signs of CSE do not possess the same degree of certainty and ability when the 
question is framed within a radicalisation context. This is symptomatic of the lack of 
consensus in viewing radicalisation as a safeguarding and child protection issue and is 
reminiscent of the way in which CSE was viewed prior to the Rotherham and Rochdale 
scandals being investigated. 
 
Reporting 
The literature indicated confusion amongst school teachers and other practitioners, 
stating that they are not confident about what radicalisation related concerns they should and 
should not report (Quartermaine, 2014, pp. 13-29). Instances of poor decision making have 
been widely publicised in international media. There have been instances where school 
teachers have reported children to police and prevent practitioners over misunderstandings or 
miscommunications in the classroom, such as the case where staff at a nursery in Luton had 
threatened to report a Four-year-old boy to prevent practitioners over a picture he had drawn 
of his father cutting a cucumber. The boy’s mispronunciation of cucumber was believed by 
staff to mean ‘cooker bomb’, which lead them to suspect that the child’s father was a bomb 
maker (The Guardian, 2016). 
The research supported the literature and the original hypothesis as it demonstrated a 
substantial lack of understanding amongst participants of how to report concerns related to 
radicalisation.  Participants were asked “Would you know, if needed, how to report a concern 
related to Radicalisation, and who to?”. One participant stated;  
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“I’d just report it to the police. And hopefully they’d earmark me to the right person 
really” P03. 
 
Only one participant mentioned the prevent coordinator as being the correct person to report 
their concerns to, but again this was tentative and uncertain. This participant was one of two 
who had undertaken the WRAP training in a previous role, and stated; 
 
“If I was working with the family would it be me, or the social worker? It would 
probably go to the Prevent coordinator I think” P05. 
 
The participants were again more confident in their responses when asked about reporting 
concerns related to CSE. The responses generally illustrated a lack of autonomy and personal 
responsibility of practitioners to report concerns related to radicalisation, all of which seem 
likely to originate from a lack of confidence underpinned by insufficient training and 
awareness of radicalisation and its associated policy and procedure. 
 
Limitations and Bias 
The sample size used for this research project is above the minimum required for this 
level of study, however it could have been beneficial to obtain a much larger sample size in 
order to capture a larger-scale voice. It would also have been useful to have included private 
residential children's homes and services within the study, however this may be more 
meaningful as a separate research project entirely.  
A small portion of the participants, namely those most senior in rank, appeared 
conscious of the fact that their responses relating to shortfalls in training provision, for 
example, may indicate their employer is not being as proactive as they could be. At times the 
participants were perceived as almost apologetic and keen to excuse their lack of training in 
this area. It can be assumed that any subconscious bias exhibited in this way by participants 
has had negligible impact upon the integrity of the data collected, if anything, it suggests that 
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the true extent of the lack of focus upon radicalisation as a safeguarding and child protection 
issue has been downplayed. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This research has highlighted the under-acknowledgement of radicalisation as a 
current and pressing safeguarding and child protection issue, with it being afforded much less 
emphasis and allocated much fewer resources than other issues such as Child Sexual 
Exploitation. The lack of training and awareness possessed by practitioners highlighted during 
this research continues to be reflected in the overwhelming disparity between the large 
number of Prevent referrals made, and the tiny percentage which are ultimately accepted into 
the Channel process and for which interventions are subsequently provided. The majority of 
such referrals are rejected on grounds of the referred individual requiring other forms of 
support not related to radicalisation, which reflects clearly the lack of understanding of 
referring practitioners as to what constitutes legitimate radicalisation related concerns. This is 
not an attempt to criticise the level of understanding of such practitioners, rather to 
acknowledge this as an inevitability due to the current insufficient training and awareness 
provision. It is hoped that upon receipt of this research data and proposed improvements, that 
local authorities will seek to improve their provision and delivery of radicalisation awareness 
and training. It is intended that local authorities will reflect upon this research and learn 
lessons from the Child Sexual Exploitation disasters in Rotherham, Rochdale and other areas 
which stemmed largely from a lack of practitioner awareness and training, without having to 
suffer similar disasters relating to radicalisation before the necessary improvements are made. 
The literature and research also highlighted the major concerns of practitioners and the 
public alike with the lack of transparency of Prevent processes and those working in Prevent 
roles. This is seen as further evidence of its covert nature and unwillingness to engage with 
those it appeals to for help. As the frequency of terror attacks on British soil continues to rise, 
with recent attacks in London and Manchester in 2017, it becomes ever more crucial for 
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authorities to gain the support and cooperation of the British public. However, as more public 
support and assistance is requested, such criticisms of the lack of transparency of Prevent 
must be answered. Communities must be trusted with more details of Prevent and its purpose, 
and their good-will and cooperation harnessed to improve community reporting and collective 
resilience. This must include the publishing of details of its Prevent and Channel outcomes 
and success measurement protocol, to allow the public at large to make informed decisions 
about their efficacy. No hard figures exist in the public domain to corroborate the rates of 
success claimed by the government, yet the public remain expected to swallow such claims 
without question or hesitation. 
Crucially, there has arisen through this research a somewhat controversial yet credible 
argument that the aspirations of individuals who are radicalised are often anything but 
extreme, in fact what they seek is love and belonging, identity, and safety and security, all of 
which are basic human needs.  Acknowledging the fact that the fulfilment of unmet basic 
needs often lays at the heart of an individual’s susceptibility to radicalisation may be an 
uncomfortable truth for government agencies, as it highlights that the pool of potential 
recruits for those wishing to radicalise vulnerable individuals far exceeds the boundaries of 
Muslim communities exploitable through theological or religious means, or deprived white 
working-class communities through socio-economic or political grievance. Without an easily 
identifiable face for the ‘potential extremist’, the sparsity and inefficacy of existing counter-
radicalisation resources will be outed, and see government agencies and practitioners forced 
to begin looking inward at the ‘us’, rather than outward at ‘them’. 
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